En The paradox of Addition and its dissolution (1969), Mario Bunge presenta algunos argumentos para mostrar que la Regla de Adición puede ocasionar paradojas o problemas semánticos. Posteriormente, Margáin (1972) y Robles (1976) mostraron que las afirmaciones de Bunge son insostenibles, al menos desde el punto de vista de la lógica clásica. Aunque estamos de acuerdo con las críticas de Margáin y Robles, no estamos de acuerdo en el diagnóstico del origen del problema y tampoco con la manera en la (...) que se proponen solucionarlo. En esta medida, en este texto mostraremos cómo la Regla de Adición sí trae problemas semánticos que pueden ser planteados desde diferentes perspectivas contemporáneas, como la extensionalidad del condicional, los principios proscriptivos y la validez conexiva. (shrink)

En The paradox of Addition and its dissolution (1969), Mario Bunge presenta algunos argumentos para mostrar que la Regla de Adición puede ocasionar paradojas o problemas semánticos. Posteriormente, Margáin (1972) y Robles (1976) mostraron que las afirmaciones de Bunge son insostenibles, al menos desde el punto de vista de la lógica clásica. Aunque estamos de acuerdo con las críticas de Margáin y Robles, no estamos de acuerdo en el diagnóstico del origen del problema y tampoco con la manera en la (...) que se proponen solucionarlo. En esta medida, en este texto mostraremos cómo la Regla de Adición sí trae problemas semánticos que pueden ser planteados desde diferentes perspectivas contemporáneas, como la extensionalidad del condicional, los principios proscriptivos y la validez conexiva. (shrink)

There is a tension between the definition of empty logic as a logic with no valid arguments and no valid meta-arguments, on the one hand, and the way in which we have usually interpreted the validity of meta-arguments, on the other. Here we argue that one way to eliminate the tension is understanding the “If. . . then. . . ” in a meta-argument, at least in the case of an empty logic, as a transplication (aka the de Finetti conditional) (...) instead of an extensional or material conditional. (shrink)

I present a discussion of some issues in the ontology of spacetime. After a characterisation of the controversies among relationists, substantivalists, eternalists, and presentists, I offer a new argument for rejecting presentism, the doctrine that only present objects exist. Then, I outline and defend a form of spacetime realism that I call event substantivalism. I propose an ontological theory for the emergence of spacetime from more basic entities. Finally, I argue that a relational theory of pre-geometric entities can give rise (...) to substantival spacetime in such a way that relationism and substantivalism are not necessarily opposed positions, but rather complementary. In an appendix I give axiomatic formulations of my ontological views. (shrink)

The republican case for workplace democracy is presented and defended from two alternative means of ensuring freedom from arbitrary interference in the firm—namely, the right to freely exit the firm and workplace regulation. This paper shows, respectively, that costless exit is neither possible nor desirable in either perfect or imperfect labor markets, and that managerial discretion is both desirable and inevitable due to the incompleteness of employment contracts and labor legislation. The paper then shows that WD is necessary, from a (...) republican standpoint, if workers’ interests are to be adequately tracked in the exercise of managerial authority. Three important objections are finally addressed— that WD is redundant, that it is unnecessary provided that litigation and unionism can produce similar outcomes, and that it falls short of ensuring republican freedom compared to self-employment. (shrink)

En la actualidad hay un renacer del interés académico por la amistad que se aborda desde múltiples disciplinas, tales como la Sociología (Spencer & Pahl, 2006), la Psicología (Hojjat & Moyer, 2017), la educación (Kristjánsson, 2022), la Política (Digeser, 2016) o las Relaciones Internacionales (Koschut & Oelsner, 2014). En filosofía, la amistad es un tema clásico que se ha abordado con interés variable en distintos momentos de la historia: para griegos y romanos fue relevante a nivel personal y político (Aristóteles, (...) 1994); los pre-modernos la concibieron como un vínculo fundamental para la estabilidad política y la administración de la justicia (Smith & Devere, 2010) y en la Ilustración siguió considerándose un vínculo valioso. A partir del siglo XIX se oscurece su papel social (Laín Entralgo, 1986) y solo a finales del XX se retoma su valor en el ámbito social, más allá del personal (Derrida, 1998). A pesar de esa atención renovada a la amistad, las investigaciones desde la antropología filosófica o la metafísica son hoy menos frecuentes que otras como las que se hacen desde la ética o la filosofía política, por lo que es relevante prestarle atención desde esta perspectiva que es la elegida en este capítulo. El objetivo es repensar la amistad en Leonardo Polo desde su antropología trascendental partiendo de una confluencia interesante entre este filósofo y Agamben: la apertura ontológica al plano existencial (trascendental, en terminología poliana). Argumentaré cómo, en continuidad con la antropología trascendental y prosiguiendo el pensamiento de Polo, la amistad puede incluirse de alguna forma en el ámbito trascendental, puede ser un “amor personal” que, como tal, radica en la persona, muestra a la persona y la hace crecer. De acuerdo con eso, la estructura del capítulo es la siguiente: explicaremos la confluencia metafísica entre ambos filósofos y el papel de la amistad en la apertura al ámbito existencial (epígrafe 2); seguiremos con los elementos de la antropología trascendental que permiten proseguir pensando la amistad (epígrafe 3); estudiaremos el amar personal y la posibilidad de los “amores personales” (epígrafe 4) y finalmente abordaremos la amistad como amor personal. (shrink)

The Kalam Cosmological Argument is perhaps the most solid and widely discussed argument for a caused creation of the universe. The usual objections to the argument mainly focus on the second premise. In this paper we discuss the dependency of the first premise on the topological structure of the space-time manifold adopted for the underlying cosmological model. It is shown that in chronology-violating space-times the first premise can also be violated. The chronology-violation, in turn, requires a massive violation of the (...) so-called energy conditions which might have observational effects that are briefly discussed here. Hence, astronomical observations could be relevant for the validity of the metaphysical argument. In this sense, it is possible to talk of “observational theology”. (shrink)

Friendship is an important bond in the personal and social growth of an individual and plays a prominent role during youth. Most scales to measure it are aimed at children and adolescents but none measure character friendship, a type of selfless friendship with ethical traits an d Aristotelian roots. Therefore, the aim of the research is to design and validate the youth Character Friendship Scale (CFS) in a sample of 1587 young Spanish people. The final version of the CFS is (...) composed of 35 items distributed over three dimensions: "Selfless love and intimacy" (21), "Trust" (7) and "Respect and forgiveness" (7) with ordinal reliability coefficients of 0.94, 0.79 and 0.7 respectively and good model fits (CFI = 0.986; TLI = 0.986; RMSEA = 0.043; SRMR = 0.054; GFI = 0.997). It is concluded that the CFS is a scale with good psychometric properties for measuring character friendship in young adults. The results obtained from its application will lead to a better understanding of the importance of character friendship for the socioemotional development or happiness of young adults and will enable the development of intervention programmes that enhance aspects of friendship such as trust, respect, forgiveness or mutual knowledge, which can facilitate collaborative relationships and contribute to social cohesion. (shrink)

La filosofía científica es filosofía informada por la ciencia, que usa herramientas exactas como la lógica y la matemática, y proporciona a la actividad científica de un marco donde dirimir las cuestiones más generales sobre la naturaleza, el lenguaje que usamos para describirla, y el conocimiento que de ella obtenemos. Muchas teorías de la filosofía científica pueden ser contrastadas y evaluadas utilizando evidencia científica. En este artículo me concentro en caracterizar a la filosofía científica y en discutir los límites de (...) la ciencia. (shrink)

Black holes are arguably the most extraordinary physical objects we know in the universe. Despite our thorough knowledge of black hole dynamics and our ability to solve Einstein’s equations in situations of ever increasing complexity, the deeper implications of the very existence of black holes for our understanding of space, time, causality, information, and many other things remain poorly understood. In this paper I survey some of these problems. If something is going to be clear from my presentation, I hope (...) it will be that around black holes science and metaphysics become more interwoven than anywhere else in the universe. (shrink)

Some metaphysicians believe that metaphysical modality is explainable by the essences of objects. In §II, I spell out the definitional view of essence, and in §III, a working notion of metaphysical explanation. Then, in §IV, I consider and reject five natural ways to explain necessity by essence: in terms of the principle that essential properties can't change, in terms of the supposed obviousness of the necessity of essential truth, in terms of the logical necessity of definitions, in terms of Fine's (...) logic of essence, and in terms of the theory of real definitions. I will conclude that the present evidence favours rejecting the hypothesis that modality is explainable by essence. (shrink)

Transformar el modo de vida individual es necesario para abordar la crisis ecosocial, y resulta perentorio que las políticas comprometidas con su resolución promocionen una capacidad individual de acción ecosocial. Sin embargo, parece que cierta brecha motivacional está obstaculizando la transformación del modo de vida individual. A fin de dar respuesta a esta brecha, ensayamos una mixtura del enfoque de las capacidades con las teorías de Hartmut Rosa. Argumentamos que la resonancia natural funge de factor personal de conversión necesario, si (...) bien no suficiente, para la capacidad de acción ecosocial; y que una política que promocione la resonancia natural se adecuaría también a los requisitos impuestos al desarrollo humano tanto por el enfoque de las capacidades como por la sostenibilidad. (shrink)

Closed time-like curves (CTCs) naturally appear in a variety of chronology-violating space{times. In these space{times, the principle of self-consistency demands a harmony between local and global a airs that excludes grandfather-like paradoxes. However, selfexisting objects trapped in CTCs are not seemingly avoided by the standard interpretation of this principle, usually constrained to a dynamical framework. In this letter we discuss whether we are committed to accept an ontology with self-existing objects if CTCs actually occur in the universe. In addition, the (...) epistemological status of the principle of self-consistency is analyzed and a discussion on the information flux through CTCs is presented. (shrink)

I present a formal ontological theory where the basic building blocks of the world can be either things or events. In any case, the result is a Parmenidean worldview where change is not a global property. What we understand by change manifests as asymmetries in the pattern of the world-lines that constitute 4-dimensional existents. I maintain that such a view is in accord with current scientific knowledge.

The reward system of science is the priority rule. The first scientist making a new discovery is rewarded with prestige, while second runners get little or nothing. Michael Strevens, following Philip Kitcher, defends this reward system, arguing that it incentivizes an efficient division of cognitive labor. I argue that this assessment depends on strong implicit assumptions about the replicability of findings. I question these assumptions on the basis of metascientific evidence and argue that the priority rule systematically discourages replication. My (...) analysis leads us to qualify Kitcher and Strevens’s contention that a priority-based reward system is normatively desirable for science. (shrink)

This article studies the political dimension of friendship in Robert Guédiguian’s cinema, delving into the crucial role that conversation plays in this relationship, and taking Stanley Cavell’s thought as a main reference. Aristotle’s concept of civic friendship, along with its contemporary readings, and Cavell’s notion of conversation provide a theoretical frame for the analysis of three recent feature films directed by Guédiguian that present a strong thematic and narrative unity (and have barely received attention in previous scholarship): Les Neiges du (...) Kilimandjaro/The Snows of Kilimanjaro (2011), La Villa/The House by the Sea (2017) and Gloria Mundi (2019). Based on, but going beyond, Cavell’s moral theorisation of the filmic portrayal of human relationships, the analysis of these films has identified four milestones in the transformative process—both personal and political—that stems from conversation with friends: conformity, confrontation, acknowledgement and renewed community. In all three films, this process of change is not only presented as a progressive discovery of one’s own voice, but also as a progressive unmasking: both are necessary prerequisites for welcoming foreigners in need of acknowledgement and, consequently, for the renewal of community. (shrink)

This article considers friendship as a channel for education and as one of its objectives, as it is a necessary ingredient for a fulfilled life. This requires an initial study of interpersonal relationships in the postmodern context, considering their opportunities and risks. Our aim is to draw a topography of these relationships by analysing texts by major thinkers of the last four decades. The result of this analysis is the core of the article, namely, that there are four categories which (...) seem to give a proper account of the characteristics of interpersonal relationships in postmodernity and are relevant in education: 1) the questioning of the individual; 2) the appearance of the internet; 3) the recoveryof emotions; and, finally; 4) the extension of the feminine space. As a conclusion, they may all be said to have an ambivalent character that requires central issues in education to be reconsidered: the awareness and emotional regulation; the new constitution of identity and intimacy on the internet; education for male-female relationships, which now exist outside the sexual sphere, and preventing violence in these relationships; as well as how to educate for cooperation in an individualistic society. (shrink)

Black holes are extremely relativistic objects. Physical processes around them occur in a regime where the gravitational field is extremely intense. Under such conditions, our representations of space, time, gravity, and thermodynamics are pushed to their limits. In such a situation philosophical issues naturally arise. In this chapter I review some philosophical questions related to black holes. In particular, the relevance of black holes for the metaphysical dispute between presentists and eternalists, the origin of the second law of thermadynamics and (...) its relation to black holes, the problem of information, black holes and hypercomputing, the nature of determinsim, and the breakdown of predictability in black hole space-times. I maintain that black hole physics can be used to illuminate some important problems in the border between science and philosophy, either epistemology and ontology. (shrink)

A supertask consists in the performance of an infinite number of actions in a finite time. I show that any attempt to carry out a supertask will produce a divergence of the curvature of spacetime, resulting in the formation of a black hole. I maintain that supertaks, contrarily to a popular view among philosophers, are physically impossible. Supertasks, literally, collapse under their own weight.

Despite growing interest in workplace democracy, the question whether nonworker stakeholders, like suppliers and local communities, warrant inclusion in the governance of democratic companies, as workers do, has been largely neglected. We inspect this question by leaning on the boundary problem in democratic theory. We first argue that the question of who warrants inclusion in democratic workplaces is best addressed by examining why workplace democracy is warranted in the first place, and offer a twofold normative benchmark—addressing objectionable corporate power and (...) upholding efficiency—to assess the principles of democratic inclusion on offer. Against this benchmark, we next argue that the All-Affected Principle is unfit due to its over- and underinclusive extensional results, and that the All-Subjected Principle, whose variants we examine alongside their extensional results, holds more promise when coupled with independent considerations of justice or a constrained variant of the All-Affected Principle. These combinations need not entirely preclude, but speak against, nonworker stakeholder inclusion. (shrink)

This brief review of Mario Bunge’s research on physics begins with an analysis of his masterpiece Foundations of Physics, and then it discusses his other contributions to the philosophy of physics. Following that is a summary of his more recent reactions to scientific discoveries in physics and a discussion of his position about non-locality in quantum mechanics, as well as his changing opinions on the nature of spacetime. The paper ends with a brief assessment of Bunge’s legacy concerning the foundations (...) of physics. (shrink)

I argue that there are no physical singularities in space–time. Singular space–time models do not belong to the ontology of the world, because of a simple reason: they are concepts, defective solutions of Einstein’s field equations. I discuss the actual implication of the so-called singularity theorems. In remarking the confusion and fog that emerge from the reification of singularities I hope to contribute to a better understanding of the possibilities and limits of the theory of general relativity.

The 'critical turn' in tourism studies is defined as a research perspective that explores social transfor- mation in and through tourism by facing the negative impact of strategic-instrumental rationality on this activity. This work explores the features of discourse ethics that may normatively support tourism transformation, a gap that has not been thoroughly discussed in tourism research. For this purpose, the study combines the use of critical and ethical theory with an analysis of discourse ethics in tourism literature to demonstrate (...) that the use of Habermasian discourse ethics needs to be complemented with the Apelian approach. Through these steps the work reveals the theoretical bases of discourse ethics to discuss whether understandings between stakeholders guided by strategic-instrumental rationality can be reached not only in the political sphere —Habermas—, but also in the ethical field —Apel. (shrink)

El Realismo Especulativo, Nuevo Realismo o Realismo Postcontinental es una corriente ecléctica que viene a superar las aporías e insuficiencias de la filosofía continental desde una perspectiva a la que se le podrían achacar los mismos problemas que la perspectiva idealista y constructivista de los filósofos continentales. Para el desarrollo de la filosofía es importante entablar conversación los autores de este movimiento. En el presente artículo se presenta una aproximación a los aciertos e insuficiencias de las ontologías de dos autores (...) de la corriente como son Markus Gabriel y Graham Harman. Se presentan los aciertos e insuficiencias del realismo neutro de Markus Gabriel y de la Ontología Orientada a los Objetos, en este orden. En el último epígrafe, a modo de conclusiones, se señalan los puntos en común de las ontologías y se aporta la idea de acontecimiento como línea de investigación que supere las aporías que emergen de la contraposición entre el idealismo y realismo. (shrink)

The ontology behind quantum mechanics has been the subject of endless debate since the theory was formulated some 100 years ago. It has been suggested, at one time or another, that the objects described by the theory may be individual particles, waves, fields, ensembles of particles, observers, and minds, among many other possibilities. I maintain that these disagreements are due in part to a lack of precision in the use of the theory’s various semantic designators. In particular, there is some (...) confusion about the role of representation, reference, and denotation in the theory. In this article, I first analyze the role of the semantic apparatus in physical theories in general and then discuss the corresponding ontological implications for quantum mechanics. Subsequently, I consider the extension of the theory to quantum fields and then analyze the semantic changes of the designators with their ontological consequences. In addition to the classical arguments to rule out a particle ontology in the case of non-relativistic quantum field theory, I show how the existence of black holes makes the proposal of a particle ontology in general spacetimes unfeasible. I conclude by proposing a provisional pluralistic ontology of fields and spacetime and discussing some prospects for possible future ontological economies. (shrink)

This is the introduction to the special issue of Crítica on the metaphysics of physics, featuring papers by Valia Allori, Tim Maudlin and Gustavo Esteban Romero.

A chapter of the book Elogio del Cientificismo.

The idea of a moving present or ‘now’ seems to form part of our most basic beliefs about reality. Such a present, however, is not reflected in any of our theories of the physical world. I show in this article that presentism, the doctrine that only what is present exists, is in conflict with modern relativistic cosmology and recent advances in neurosciences. I argue for a tenseless view of time, where what we call ‘the present’ is just an emergent secondary (...) quality arising from the interaction of perceiving self-conscious individuals with their environment. I maintain that there is no flow of time, but just an ordered system of events. (shrink)

El propósito del ensayo es ofrecer una reflexión sobre la profesión del investigador novel desde la experiencia del autor a la luz de las ideas y reflexiones ofrecidas por Pierre Bourdieu en su obra “El oficio de científico” con cuestiones actuales y retos a los que se enfrentan la comunidad científica en el ámbito de las ciencias de la educación. El texto se articula con relación a los temas que surgen de la lectura del libro de Bourdieu que se irán (...) nutriendo de los aportes de otros textos y artículos relacionados con la materia. Como señala Martel (2016), se pretende aportar un trozo de este espejo roto que es la profesión del investigador para reconstruirlo a modo de aviso para navegantes para los que vienen detrás desde la experiencia del investigador novel. (shrink)

There are several types of truths. In this paper I focus on semantic truths, and within these on factual truths. These truths are attributed to statements. I review the theory of the truth proposed by Bunge and discuss some problems that it presents. I suggest that a theory of truth of factual statements should be complemented by a theory of relevance, and propose the basic tenets of it. Finally, I briefly discuss the nature of propositions and the problem of scientific (...) truth in the light of the presented semantic theory. (shrink)

I argued against relationalism with four objections. One of those was that, under reasonable assumptions, relationalism's modal relation needs to be what I called an `extra order' relation. I recently came to notice that the objection could have been posed with much less substantive assumptions. In particular, I recently noticed that order-dissonant predications are not required for the objection; therefore, noncumulativism is not relevant for my argument.

Cuento ganador en la categoría "Mini ficción" de la compilación "El covid no es un cuento".

En aras del universalismo y en contra del totalitarismo, la ética discursiva ha mostrado con Jürgen Habermas un déficit práctico al negar a la filosofía moral la posibilidad de reflexionar sobre las condiciones alienantes del diálogo desde un ethos concreto. Este artículo analiza el modo en que la teoría de la resonancia formulada por Hartmut Rosa permite revitalizar el debate sobre las condiciones que pueden minar las bases para el diálogo en las sociedades aceleradas sin apoyarse en el concepto de (...) ethos, sino en el de modo de relacionarse con el mundo [Modus der Weltbeziehung]. (shrink)

Political theorists have recently sought to replace the liberal, contractual theory of the firm with a political view that models the authority relation of employee to firm, and its appropriate regulation, on that of subject to state. This view is liable to serious difficulties, however, given existing discontinuities between corporate and civil authority as to their coerciveness, entry and exit conditions, scope, legal standing, and efficiency constraints. I here inspect these, and argue that, albeit in some cases significant, such discontinuities (...) fail to undermine the firm/state analogy, either because they are not significant enough to do so or because the particular trait on which they hinge is not decisive for how authority, in the state and in the firm, should be regulated to be legitimate. A pro tanto requirement exists, I thus argue, that corporate authority be held to regulatory norms comparable to those legitimate states abide by, including civil liberties, rule-of-law constraints, and accountability to subjects. (shrink)

On a highly influential way to think of modality, that I call ‘relationalism’, the modality of a state is explained by its being composed of properties, and these properties being related by a higher-order and primitively modal relation. Examples of relationalism are the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong account of natural necessity, many dispositional essentialist views, and Wang’s incompatibility primitivism. I argue that relationalism faces four difficulties: that the selection between modal relations is arbitrary, that the modal relation cannot belong to any logical order, (...) that to explain how the modal relation can relate properties of different adicities additional ideological complexity has to be introduced, and that not all modal constraints are relational. From the discussion, I will extract desiderata for a successor theory of modality. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that some human reproductive genome editing interventions can be therapeutic in nature, and thus that it is false that all such interventions just create healthy individuals. I do this by showing that the conditions established by a therapy definition are met by certain reproductive genome editing interventions. I then defend this position against two objections: (a) reproductive genome editing interventions do not attain one of the two conditions for something to be a therapy, and (b) (...) some reproductive genome editing interventions are therapeutic but in a nonstandard way. In the Conclusion I call for a more nuanced discussion of the nature of reproductive genome editing interventions. (shrink)

⦿ In my dissertation I introduce, motivate and take the first steps in the implementation of, the project of naturalising modal metaphysics: the transformation of the field into a chapter of the philosophy of science rather than speculative, autonomous metaphysics. -/- ⦿ In the introduction, I explain the concept of naturalisation that I apply throughout the dissertation, which I argue to be an improvement on Ladyman and Ross' proposal for naturalised metaphysics. I also object to Williamson's proposal that modal metaphysics (...) --- or some view in the area --- is already a quasi-scientific discipline. -/- ⦿ Recently, some philosophers have argued that the notion of metaphysical modality is as ill defined as to be of little theoretical utility. In the second chapter I intend to contribute to such skepticism. First, I observe that each of the proposed marks of the concept, except for factivity, is highly controversial; thus, its logical structure is deeply obscure. With the failure of the "first principles" approach, I examine the paradigmatic intended applications of the concept, and argue that each makes it a device for a very specific and controversial project: a device, therefore, for which a naturalist will find no use for. I conclude that there is no well-defined or theoretically useful notion of objective necessity other than logical or physical necessity, and I suggest that naturalising modal metaphysics can provide more stable methodological foundations. -/- ⦿ In the third chapter I answer a possible objection against the in-principle viability of the project: that the concept of metaphysical modality cannot be understood through the philosophical analysis of any scientific theory, since metaphysical necessity "transcends'' natural necessity, and science only deals with the latter. I argue that the most important arguments for this transcendence thesis fail or face problems that, as of today, remain unsolved. -/- ⦿ Call the idea that science doesn't need modality, "demodalism''. Demodalism is a first step in a naturalistic argument for modal antirealism. In the fourth chapter I examine six versions of demodalism to explain why a family of formalisms, that I call "spaces of possibility'', are (i) used in a quasi-ubiquitous way in mathematised sciences (I provide examples from theoretical computer science to microeconomics), (ii) scientifically interpreted in modal terms, and (iii) used for at least six important tasks: (1) defining laws and theories; (2) defining important concepts from different sciences (I give several examples); (3) making essential classifications; (4) providing different types of explanations; (5) providing the connection between theory and statistics, and (6) understanding the transition between a theory and its successor (as is the case with quantisation). -/- ⦿ In fifth chapter I propose and defend a naturalised modal ontology. This is a realism about modal structure: my realism about constraints. The modal structure of a system are the relationships between its possible states and between its possible states and those of other systems. It is given by the plurality of restrictions to which said system is subject. A constraint is a factor that explains the impossibility of a class of states; I explain this concept further. First, I defend my point of view by rejecting some of its main rivals: constructive empiricism, Humean conventionalism, and wave function realism, as they fail to make sense of quantum chaos. This is because the field requires the notion of objective modal structure, and the mentioned views have trouble explaining the modal facts of quantum dynamics. Then, I argue that constraint realism supersedes these views in the context of Bohm's standard theory and mechanics, and underpins the study of quantum chaos. Finally, I consider and reject two possible problems for my point of view. -/- ⦿ A central concern of modal metaphysicians has been to understand the logical system that best characterises necessity. In the sixth chapter I intend to recover the logical project applied to my naturalistic modal metaphysics. Scientists and philosophers of science accept different degrees of physical necessity, ranging from purely mathematically necessary facts that restrict physical behaviour, to kinetic principles, to particular dynamical constraints. I argue that this motivates a multimodal approach to modal logic, and that the time dependence of dynamics motivates a logic of historical necessity. I propose multimodal propositional (classical) logics for Bohmian mechanics and the Everettian theory of many divergent worlds, and I close with a criticism of Williamson's approach to the logic of state spaces of dynamic systems. (shrink)

It is widely held that there is a distinctive norm of assertion. A plausible idea is that there is an analogous, perhaps weaker, norm for indirect communication via implicatures. I argue against this type of proposal. My claim is that the norm of assertion is a social norm governing public updates to the conversational record. Off the record implicatures are not subject to social norms of this type. I grant that, as happens in general with intentional actions, off the record (...) communicative acts may be subject to normative assessments on different levels (for instance, regarding their moral or prudential appropriateness). However, such assessments do not generate distinctive norms that apply to all cases of implicature. (shrink)

En este artículo discuto cómo es que la idea intuitiva de que las cosas podrían cambiar, combinada con principios excesivamente plausibles, nos lleva a la paradoja de Chisholm. Arguyo que la mejor respuesta a esta paradoja –pues efectúa la menor mutilación a nuestros principios teóricos y asunciones intuitivas– es la postura esencialista. Primero expongo algunas motivaciones para hacer una teoría metafísica que explique la modalidad de re. Luego reviso los principios a los que estaremos regresando en el curso del artículo. (...) Entonces muestro cómo ellos, conjuntamente, implican la paradoja de Chisholm. Después reviso las posibles fuentes de esta paradoja, rechazando varias salidas posibles. Argumento que la fuente de la paradoja está en que nuestros principios teóricos son demasiado liberales, y que la opción esencialista subsana este defecto. (shrink)

I offer a theory of art that is based on science. I maintain that, as any other human activity, art can be studied with the tools of science. This does not mean that art is scientific, but aesthetics, the theory of art, can be formulated in accord with our scientific knowledge. I present elucidations of the concepts of aesthetic experience, art, work of art, artistic movement, and I discuss the ontological status of artworks from the point of view of scientific (...) philosophy. (shrink)

Se presenta un breve análisis comparativo del lenguaje religioso y el lenguaje científico.

I offer an analysis of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and its relevancy for the scientific endeavour. I submit that the world is not, and cannot be, rational—only some brained beings are. The Principle of Sufficient Reason is not a necessary truth nor a physical law. It is just a guiding metanomological hypothesis justified a posteriori by its success in helping us to unveil the mechanisms that operate in Nature.

Workplace democracy is often defined, and has recently been defended, as a form of intra-firm governance in which workers have control rights over management with no ownership requirement on their part. Using the normative tools of republican political theory, the paper examines bargaining power disparities and moral hazard problems resulting from the allocation of control rights and ownership to different groups within democratic firms, with a particular reference to the European codetermination system. With various qualifications related to potentially mitigating factors, (...) such as workforce and shareholder composition or risk aversion and reallocation, the paper contends that forms of workplace democracy in which workers control and own the firm, such as cooperativism, are preferable to other forms, such as codetermination, in which ownership and control rights are formally separated. (shrink)

There has been much debate recently on the question whether essence can explain modality. Here, I examine two routes to an essentialist account of modality. The first is Hale's argument for the necessity of essence, which I will argue is — notwithstanding recent attempted defences of it — invalid by its very structure. The second is the proposal that it is essential to essential truth that it is necessary. After offering three possible versions of the view, I will argue that (...) each fails to provide a metaphysical explanation of necessity in terms of essence. (shrink)

Comenzamos este texto con una pregunta, por algo que podríamos llamar un signo propio de la época, a saber, la proliferación de aproximaciones espaciales a los más diversos problemas y desde las más diversas disciplinas. No podemos dejar de notar que eso, cuyos signos se dejan recoger a pesar de su dispersión, en algo que llamamos época, sobreviene después de un agotamiento de la radicalización del historicismo y de un pensamiento del tiempo.

I discuss the ontological assumptions and implications of General Relativity. I maintain that General Relativity is a theory about gravitational fields, not about space-time. The latter is a more basic ontological category, that emerges from physical relations among all existents. I also argue that there are no physical singularities in space-time. Singular space-time models do not belong to the ontology of the world: they are not things but concepts, i.e. defective solutions of Einstein’s field equations. I briefly discuss the actual (...) implication of the so-called singularity theorems in General Relativity and some problems related to ontological assumptions of Quantum Gravity. (shrink)

La representación científica del mundo se construye sobre un tejido de teorías en las cuales hay enunciados generales que representan leyes naturales. Estas leyes son patrones de sucesos regulares. Un presupuesto básico de la ciencia es que todo acontecimiento es legal: ocurre regido por leyes que son fijas. ¿Es compatible esa legalidad con la libertad de elección que creemos tener? ¿Cuáles son las implicaciones para la libertad política que debemos esperar en una sociedad organizada y racional? ¿Cuál es el rol (...) de la ética en todo esto? Trataré de responder a estas preguntas aquí, defendiendo la concepción de una sociedad abierta, democrática y plural, que maximice la libertad de elección y acción de las personas que la forman. (shrink)

Workplace democracy is often advocated on two intertwined views. The first is that the authority relation of employee to firm is akin to that of subject to state, such that reasons favoring democracy in the state may likewise apply to the firm. The second is that, when democratic controls are absent in the workplace, employees are liable to objectionable forms of subordination by their bosses, who may then issue arbitrary directives on matters ranging from pay to the allocation of overtime (...) and to relocation and promotion. Daniel Jacob and Christian Neuhäuser have recently submitted these views to careful criticism. They argue that the parallel between firms and states is unwarranted. For, unlike managerial authority, state authority is final. The state grants firms their legal status and subjects their authority to its regulations, which citizens in democracies already control. And they also argue that suitable workplace regulation alongside meaningful exit options may suffice to prevent, with no need for democratization, objectionable forms of workplace subjection. Neither view offers, they resolve, compelling reasons to believe that justice requires that firms be democratic. I here inspect these criticisms in turn, and offer reasons for skepticism. (shrink)